Related papers: The Schulze Method of Voting
Conflict of interest is the permanent companion of any population of agents (computational or biological). For that reason, the ability to compromise is of paramount importance, making voting a key element of societal mechanisms. One of the…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to expect that computing the winner of an election is at least…
This paper provides a serious attempt towards constructing a switching-algebraic theory for weighted monotone voting systems, whether they are scalar-weighted or vector-weighted. The paper concentrates on the computation of a prominent…
We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that…
We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score…
A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the…
In 1998 a long-lost proposal for an election law by Gottlob Frege (1848--1925) was rediscovered in the Th\"uringer Universit\"ats- und Landesbibliothek in Jena, Germany. The method that Frege proposed for the election of representatives of…
We use Hotelling's spatial model of competition to investigate the position-taking behaviour of political candidates under a class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. In a scoring rule election, voters rank all the candidates…
The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize")…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
Majority voting is considered an effective method to enhance chain-of-thought reasoning, as it selects the answer with the highest "self-consistency" among different reasoning paths (Wang et al., 2023). However, previous chain-of-thought…
We consider the problem of recovering the ground truth ordering (ranking, top-$k$, or others) over a large number of alternatives. The wisdom of crowd is a heuristic approach based on Condorcet's Jury theorem to address this problem through…
There is a growing need for discrete choice models that account for the complex nature of human choices, escaping traditional behavioral assumptions such as the transitivity of pairwise preferences. Recently, several parametric models of…
By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…
American democracy is currently heavily reliant on plurality in single-member districts, or PSMD, as a system of election. But public perceptions of fairness are often keyed to partisan proportionality, or the degree of congruence between…
Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…