Related papers: On influence and compromise in two-tier voting sys…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
We provide elementary proofs of several results concerning the possible outcomes arising from a fixed profile within the class of positional voting systems. Our arguments enable a simple and explicit construction of paradoxical profiles,…
Most analyses of manipulation of voting schemes have adopted two assumptions that greatly diminish their practical import. First, it is usually assumed that the manipulators have full knowledge of the votes of the nonmanipulating agents.…
There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of…
It is widely believed that one's peers influence product adoption behaviors. This relationship has been linked to the number of signals a decision-maker receives in a social network. But it is unclear if these same principles hold when the…
Elections employ various voting systems to determine winners based on voters' preferences. However, many recent ranked-choice elections have forced voters to truncate their ballots by only ranking a subset of the candidates. This study…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
The technique of $Q$-polinomials are used to derive the $w$- constraints in the two-matrix and Kontsevich-like model at finite $N$. These constraints are closed and form Lie algebra. They are associated with the matrices, $\lambda…
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters to select a single first-choice candidate and approve…
We introduce a voting model that is similar to a Keynesian beauty contest and analyze it from a mathematical point of view. There are two types of voters-copycat and independent-and two candidates. Our voting model is a binomial…
The notion of market impact is subtle and sometimes misinterpreted. Here we argue that impact should not be misconstrued as volatility. In particular, the so-called ``square-root impact law'', which states that impact grows as the…
We present a model of voting behaviour based on a version of aggregated overdispersed multinomial distributions; relative to a similar model by \citet{BP86}, our model is based on more realistic assumptions and free from certain…
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii)…
Determining the power distribution of the members of a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee is a well-known problem for many applications. In some cases it turns out that power is nearly proportional to relative voting weights,…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…
Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…
We study the problem of reconstructing the probability measure of the Curie-Weiss model from a sample of the voting behaviour of a subset of the population. While originally used to study phase transitions in statistical mechanics, the…
For $f$ a weighted voting scheme used by $n$ voters to choose between two candidates, the $n$ \emph{Shapley-Shubik Indices} (or {\em Shapley values}) of $f$ provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome…