Related papers: On influence and compromise in two-tier voting sys…
Quadratic Surveys (QSs) elicit more accurate preferences than traditional methods like Likert-scale surveys. However, the cognitive load associated with QSs has hindered their adoption in digital surveys for collective decision-making. We…
Complementarity relations between various characterizations of a probability distribution are at the core of information theory. In particular, lower and upper bounds for the entropic function are of great importance. In applied topics, we…
This paper studies the allocation of voting weights in a committee representing groups of different sizes. We introduce a partial ordering of weight allocations based on stochastic comparison of social welfare. We show that when the number…
Robust model fitting is a fundamental problem in computer vision: used to pre-process raw data in the presence of outliers. Maximisation of Consensus (MaxCon) is one of the most popular robust criteria and widely used. Recently (Tennakoon…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…
The voter model is a classical interacting particle system, modelling how global consensus is formed by local imitation. We analyse the time to consensus for a particular family of voter models when the underlying structure is a scale-free…
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying…
Multiparametric statistical model providing stable reconstruction of parameters by observations is considered. The only general method of this kind is the root model based on the representation of the probability density as a squared…
Employing two models, we show that various counting functions of a random variable defined by restriction or contraction of a ranked set with multiplicity (e.g., classical and arithmetic matroids) have expectations given by the…
The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility…
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for…
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system…
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency,…
The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
Research on the causes of political polarization points towards multiple drivers of the problem, from social and psychological to economic and technological. However, political institutions stand out, because -- while capable of…
Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important…