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Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
Submodularity is a key property in discrete optimization. Submodularity has been widely used for analyzing the greedy algorithm to give performance bounds and providing insight into the construction of valid inequalities for mixed-integer…
Algorithms increasingly automate bidding in online auctions, raising concerns about tacit bid suppression and revenue shortfalls. Prior work identifies individual mechanisms behind algorithmic bid suppression, but it remains unclear which…
This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism…
In this paper, we investigate a class of submodular problems which in general are very hard. These include minimizing a submodular cost function under combinatorial constraints, which include cuts, matchings, paths, etc., optimizing a…
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…
Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among…
Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints have been traditionally modeled in mechanism design as…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
This paper studies Vickrey first-price auctions under binary feedback. Leveraging the enhanced performance of machine learning algorithms, the new algorithm uses past information to improve the regret bounds of the BROAD-OMD algorithm.…
In the classical selection problem, the input consists of a collection of elements and the goal is to pick a subset of elements from the collection such that some objective function $f$ is maximized. This problem has been studied…
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…
We study the problem of selling a good to a group of bidders with interdependent values in a prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of $k$ different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function…
We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as {\em capacitated} and seek mechanisms that maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive…
In this paper, we design and develop a pricing model applicable to strategy proof pricing. To provide an economic stability towards its consumers. The economic model we use is Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). By this each service provider has…
Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cut's revenue is increasing in budgets and…
We study minimum entropy submodular optimization, a common generalization of the minimum entropy set cover problem, studied earlier by Cardinal et al., and the submodular set cover problem. We give a general bound of the approximation…
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal…
Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2018) gave a mechanism that has optimal competitive ratio…
We give a simpler analysis of the ascending auction of Bikhchandani, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra to sell a welfare-maximizing base of a matroid at Vickrey prices. The new proofs for economic efficiency and the charge of Vickrey prices…