Related papers: Exploiting Weak Supermodularity for Coalition-Proo…
Incentivizing the existing participants to invite new participants to join an auction, matching or cooperative game have been extensively studied recently. One common challenge to design such incentive in these games is that the invitees…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
One of the recognized principal issues brought along by the steadfast migration towards power electronic interfaced energy sources is the loss of rotational inertia. In conventional power systems, the inertia of the synchronous machines…
We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant. Moreover, it explicitly supplies a…
We analyze the performance of the greedy algorithm, and also a discrete semi-gradient based algorithm, for maximizing the sum of a suBmodular and suPermodular (BP) function (both of which are non-negative monotone non-decreasing) under two…
We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of…
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions…
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mechanisms for two-sided markets, in which buyers and sellers act…
An overview of different variants of the submodular welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In particular, I studied the existing algorithmic and game theoretic results for submodular welfare maximization problem and its…
There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by…
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…
With the rise of smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged in public good auctions, allowing "small" bidders to gather together and enlarge their influence in high-valued auctions. However, models and…
Market power exercise in the electricity markets distorts market prices and diminishes social welfare. Many markets have implemented market power mitigation processes to eliminate the impact of such behavior. The design of mitigation…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The optimal mechanism is two-stage: at stage-1 bidders register…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the minimal cost of acquisition and maximal efficiency, they…
Submodular optimization has numerous applications such as crowdsourcing and viral marketing. In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of non-negative submodular function maximization subject to a $k$-system constraint, which…