A Simplified Analysis of the Ascending Auction to Sell a Matroid Base
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-11-26 v2
Abstract
We give a simpler analysis of the ascending auction of Bikhchandani, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra to sell a welfare-maximizing base of a matroid at Vickrey prices. The new proofs for economic efficiency and the charge of Vickrey prices only require a few matroid folklore theorems, therefore shortening the analysis of the design goals of the auction significantly.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2404.12121,
title = {A Simplified Analysis of the Ascending Auction to Sell a Matroid Base},
author = {Britta Peis and Niklas Rieken},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.12121},
year = {2024}
}