Related papers: Replicator equation on networks with degree regula…
We investigate how network structure influences evolutionary games on networks. We extend the pair approximation to study the effects of degree fluctuation and clustering of the network. We find that a larger fluctuation of the degree is…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
A replicator dynamic for non-exchangeable agents in a continuous action space is formulated and its well-posedness is proven in a space of probability measures. The non-exchangeability allows for the analysis of evolutionary games involving…
We study the multi-strategy stochastic evolutionary game with death-birth updating in expanding spatial populations of size $N\to \infty$. The model is a voter model perturbation. For typical populations, we require perturbation strengths…
Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms…
We consider the general properties of the replicator dynamical system from the standpoint of its evolution and stability. Vector field analysis as well as spectral properties of such system has been studied. Lyaponuv function for…
The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies,…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
In this paper, we deal with the equilibrium selection problem, which amounts to steering a population of individuals engaged in strategic game-theoretic interactions to a desired collective behavior. In the literature, this problem has been…
Can a graph specifying the pattern of connections of a dynamical network be reconstructed from statistical properties of a signal generated by such a system? In this model study, we present an evolutionary algorithm for reconstruction of…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
A biologically motivated individual-based framework for evolution in network-structured populations is developed that can accommodate eco-evolutionary dynamics. This framework is used to construct a network birth and death model. The…
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
Although learning has found wide application in multi-agent systems, its effects on the temporal evolution of a system are far from understood. This paper focuses on the dynamics of Q-learning in large-scale multi-agent systems modeled as…
The past decade has seen tremendous growth in the field of Complex Social Networks. Several network generation models have been extensively studied to develop an understanding of how real world networks evolve over time. Two important…
In this paper I study the natural selection between two games to determine, which game will dominate in the community as a result of natural selection. The formalization of this question in the form of a parametrized game and the…
A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners…
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…