Related papers: Replicator equation on networks with degree regula…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
We present a method for using neural networks to model evolutionary population dynamics, and draw parallels to recent deep learning advancements in which adversarially-trained neural networks engage in coevolutionary interactions. We…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
The now classical replicator equation describes a wide variety of biological phenomena, including those in theoretical genetics, evolutionary game theory, or in the theories of the origin of life. Among other questions, the permanence of…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Population structure can be modelled by evolutionary graphs, which can have a substantial, but very subtle influence on the fate of the arising mutants. Individuals are located on the nodes of these graphs, competing with each other to…
We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate, and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such process leads…
Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the…
We propose a model of evolutionary snowdrift game with $N$-person interactions and study the effects of multi-person interactions on the emergence of cooperation. An exact $N$-th-order equation for the equilibrium density of cooperators…
Graphs are used in many disciplines to model the relationships that exist between objects in a complex discrete system. Researchers may wish to compare a network of interest to a "typical" graph from a family (or ensemble) of graphs which…
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens…
We consider an evolving network of a fixed number of nodes. The allocation of edges is a dynamical stochastic process inspired by biological reproduction dynamics, namely by deleting and duplicating existing nodes and their edges. The…
The replicator-mutator equation is a model for populations of individuals carrying different traits, with a fitness function mediating their ability to replicate, and a stochastic model for mutation. We derive analytical solutions for the…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
We analyze from basic physical considerations the Darwinian competition for reproduction (evolutionary dynamics) of strategists in a Public Goods Game, the archetype for $n$-agent (group) economical and biological interactions. In the…
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…