Related papers: Price of Anarchy for Mean Field Games
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the…
The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics centers on the…
We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such…
The price of anarchy (PoA) has been widely used in static games to quantify the loss of efficiency due to noncooperation. Here, we extend this concept to a general differential games framework. In addition, we introduce the price of…
Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a…
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds…
We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand…
We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…
The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…
We study cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems where the activation cost of the server at any given time is a function of its load. We focus on monomial cost functions and consider both the case when the degree is less than one…
In this paper, we extend the discussion of the price of anarchy of machine scheduling games to a multi-stage machine setting. The multi-stage setting arises naturally in manufacturing pipelines and distributed computing workflows, when each…
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…
We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable…
The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized,…