Related papers: On a Generic Security Game Model
Learning algorithms are essential for the applications of game theory in a networking environment. In dynamic and decentralized settings where the traffic, topology and channel states may vary over time and the communication between agents…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…
Motivated by the need to secure cyber-physical systems against attacks, we consider the problem of estimating the state of a noisy linear dynamical system when a subset of sensors is arbitrarily corrupted by an adversary. We propose a…
This paper addresses the question whether model knowledge can guide a defender to appropriate decisions, or not, when an attacker intrudes into control systems. The model-based defense scheme considered in this study, namely Bayesian…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each…
Remote estimation is a crucial element of real time monitoring of a stochastic process. While most of the existing works have concentrated on obtaining optimal sampling strategies, motivated by malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems,…
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in technologies and services in modern network applications, including smart grid management, wireless communication, cybersecurity as well as multi-agent autonomous systems. Considering the…
Security attacks present unique challenges to self-adaptive system design due to the adversarial nature of the environment. However, modeling the system as a single player, as done in prior works in security domain, is insufficient for the…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…
This paper studies optimal communication and coordination strategies in cyber-physical systems for both defender and attacker within a game-theoretic framework. We model the communication network of a cyber-physical system as a sensor…
Data ecosystems are becoming larger and more complex due to online tracking, wearable computing, and the Internet of Things. But privacy concerns are threatening to erode the potential benefits of these systems. Recently, users have…
To evaluate the safety and usefulness of deployment protocols for untrusted AIs, AI Control uses a red-teaming exercise played between a protocol designer and an adversary. This paper introduces AI-Control Games, a formal decision-making…
Given a large number of homogeneous players that are distributed across three possible states, we consider the problem in which these players have to control their transition rates, while minimizing a cost. The optimal transition rates are…
Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior,…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
When interacting with other decision-making agents in non-adversarial scenarios, it is critical for an autonomous agent to have inferable behavior: The agent's actions must convey their intention and strategy. We model the inferability…
Strategic interactions ranging from politics and pharmaceuticals to e-commerce and social networks support equilibria in which agents with private information manipulate others which are vulnerable to deception. Especially in cyberspace and…
Attacks, including the manipulation of sensor readings and the modification of actuator commands, pose a significant challenge to the security and privacy of automated systems. This paper considers discrete event systems that can be modeled…