Related papers: On a Generic Security Game Model

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…

In imperfect-information games, agents must make decisions based on partial knowledge of the game state. The Belief Stochastic Game model addresses this challenge by delegating state estimation to the game model itself. This allows agents…

The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended…

In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…

Many intelligent user interfaces employ application and user models to determine the user's preferences, goals and likely future actions. Such models require application analysis, adaptation and expansion. Building and maintaining such…

In many security applications of cyber-physical systems, a system designer must guarantee that critical missions are satisfied against attacks in the sensors and actuators of the CPS. Traditional security design of CPSs often assume that…

Protecting against adversarial attacks is a common multiagent problem. Attackers in the real world are predominantly human actors, and the protection methods often incorporate opponent models to improve the performance when facing humans.…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

Recent years have seen increased interest in the design and deployment of smart grid devices and control algorithms. Each of these smart communicating devices represents a potential access point for an intruder spurring research into…

Given the scale of consequences attributable to cyber attacks, the field of cybersecurity has long outgrown ad-hoc decision-making. A popular choice to provide disciplined decision-making in cybersecurity is Game Theory, which seeks to…

In imperfect information games, the evaluation of a game state not only depends on the observable world but also relies on hidden parts of the environment. As accessing the obstructed information trivialises state evaluations, one approach…

Traditional game-theoretic research for security applications primarily focuses on the allocation of external protection resources to defend targets. This work puts forward the study of a new class of games centered around strategically…

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…

We introduce a pursuit game played between a team of a sensor and an attacker and a mobile target in the unbounded Euclidean plane. The target is faster than the sensor, but slower than the attacker. The sensor's objective is to keep the…

This paper discusses the problem of estimating the state of a linear time-invariant system when some of its sensors and actuators are compromised by an adversarial agent. In the model considered in this paper, the malicious agent attacks an…

Global games form a subclass of games with incomplete information where a set of agents decide actions against a regime with an underlying fundamental $\theta$ representing its power. Each agent has access to an independent noisy…

We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is an immobile sensor (e.g., a ground radar station) that can sense the evader's…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…