Related papers: Range results for some social choice correspondenc…
A novel algorithm for the computation of the quadratic numerical range is presented and exemplified yielding much better results in less time compared to the random vector sampling method. Furthermore, a bound on the probability for the…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to identify outcomes that are Pareto optimal and to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process. We consider participation notions as formalized by…
We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
We present correspondences induced by some classical mappings between measures on an interval and measures on the unit circle. More precisely, we link their sequences of orthogonal polynomial and their recursion coefficients. We also deduce…
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…
We investigate binary voting systems with two types of voters and a hierarchy among the members in each type, so that members in one class have more influence or importance than members in the other class. The purpose of this paper is to…
We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at…
Election data represent a precious source of information to study human behavior at a large scale. In proportional elections with open lists, the number of votes received by a candidate, rescaled by the average performance of all…
A key task in certain democratic processes is to produce a concise slate of statements that proportionally represents the full spectrum of user opinions. This task is similar to committee elections, but unlike traditional settings, the…
A multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper. The model includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector criterion, and n preference relations of the decision makers (DMs). Each preference relation is a cone relation…
We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based measures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the committee members) with diversity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the…
When can a majority of voters find common ground, that is, a position they all agree upon? How does the shape of the political spectrum influence the outcome? When mathematical objects have a social interpretation, the associated theorems…
To aggregate rankings into a social ranking, one can use scoring systems such as Plurality, Veto, and Borda. We distinguish three types of methods: ranking by score, ranking by repeatedly choosing a winner that we delete and rank at the…
We present a class of orderings L for which there exists a profile u of preferences for a fixed odd number of individuals such that Borda's rule maps u to L.
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that…