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Self-play, where the algorithm learns by playing against itself without requiring any direct supervision, has become the new weapon in modern Reinforcement Learning (RL) for achieving superhuman performance in practice. However, the…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
Sequential equilibrium is the conventional approach for analyzing multi-stage games of incomplete information. It relies on mutual consistency of beliefs. To relax mutual consistency, I theoretically and experimentally explore the dynamic…
We study routing games where every agent sequentially decides her next edge when she obtains the green light at each vertex. Because every edge only has capacity to let out one agent per round, an edge acts as a FIFO waiting queue that…
We study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are consistent with observed equilibrium play. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based on convex optimization to address this problem for many classes…
The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We consider a version of prisoner's dilemma (PD) in this framework with three players and characterize the Nash equilibria. A variation of the standard PD…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
While significant progress has been made in specifying neural networks capable of representing uncertainty, deep networks still often suffer from overconfidence and misaligned predictive distributions. Existing approaches for measuring this…
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…
In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
Games are natural models for multi-agent machine learning settings, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs). The desirable outcomes from algorithmic interactions in these games are encoded as game theoretic equilibrium concepts, e.g.…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
Traditional game theory assumes that the players in the game are aware of the rules of the game. However, in practice, often the players are unaware or have only partial knowledge about the game they are playing. They may also have…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…