Related papers: Weighted Committee Games
We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. Because of…
We analyse two-tier voting systems with voters described by a multi-group mean-field model that allows for correlated voters both within groups as well as across group boundaries. In this model voters are influenced by voters within their…
Consider a situation with $n$ agents or players where some of the players form a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not…
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
We study the manipulability of social choice correspondences in situations where individuals have incomplete information about others' preferences. We propose a general concept of manipulability that depends on the extension rule used to…
Quantitative measures of randomness in games are useful for game design and have implications for gambling law. We treat the outcome of a game as a random variable and derive a closed-form expression and estimator for the variance in the…
In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…
We augment Assumption Based Argumentation (ABA for short) with weighted argumentation. In a nutshell, we assign weights to arguments and then derive the weight of attacks between ABA arguments. We illustrate our proposal through running…
Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…
The paper studies information markets concerning single events from an epistemic social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections and…
We introduce and study Minkowski games. These are two player games, where the players take turns to chose positions in $\mathbb{R}^d$ based on some rules. Variants include boundedness games, where one player wants to keep the positions…
An algorithm is proposed to verify whether a finite game is a weighted potential game (WPG) without pre-knowledge on its weights. Then the algorithm is also applied to find the closest WPG for a given finite game. The concept and criterion…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…
We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…
We consider weighted negatively reinforced urn schemes with finitely many colours. An urn scheme is called negatively reinforced, if the selection probability for a colour is proportional to the weight $w$ of the colour proportion, where…