Related papers: Approximately Stable Matchings with Budget Constra…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
We consider a discrete-time bipartite matching model with random arrivals of units of supply and demand that can wait in queues located at the nodes in the network. A control policy determines which are matched at each time. The focus is on…
We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…
A matching in a two-sided market often incurs an externality: a matched resource may become unavailable to the other side of the market, at least for a while. This is especially an issue in online platforms involving human experts as the…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the resulting matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical and…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We consider the well-studied Hospital Residents (HR) problem in the presence of lower quotas (LQ). The input instance consists of a bipartite graph $G = (\mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{H}, E)$ where $\mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ denote sets of…
We improve the upper bound for the maximum possible number of stable matchings among $n$ jobs and $n$ applicants from $131072^n+O(1)$ to $3.55^n+O(1)$. To establish this bound, we state a novel formulation of a certain entropy bound that is…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
A frequent problem in settings where a unique resource must be shared among users is how to resolve the contention that arises when all of them must use it, but the resource allows only for one user each time. The application of efficient…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward function. While prior work largely focuses on unconstrained…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online…