Related papers: Approximately Stable Matchings with Budget Constra…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose--accept rounds executed by the Gale--Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at…
In modern data center networks, thousands of hosts contend for shared link capacity; the scale of these systems makes centralized scheduling impractical. This article models such scheduling as a bipartite matching problem under…
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a…
The comparison of different medical treatments from observational studies or across different clinical studies is often biased by confounding factors such as systematic differences in patient demographics or in the inclusion criteria for…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
This paper introduces a unified framework for stable matching, which nests the traditional definition of stable matching in finite markets and the continuum definition of stable matching from Azevedo and Leshno (2016) as special cases.…
We study probabilistic protocols for concurrent threshold-based load balancing in networks. There are n resources or machines represented by nodes in an undirected graph and m >> n users that try to find an acceptable resource by moving…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching problems under a novel type of distributional constraints, resource-regional caps. In the context of college admissions, under resource-regional caps, an admitted student may be provided with a unit…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), reward, and welfare. Our first result is a strong…
We consider a non-stationary variant of a sequential stochastic optimization problem, in which the underlying cost functions may change along the horizon. We propose a measure, termed variation budget, that controls the extent of said…
In the problem of online load balancing on uniformly related machines with bounded migration, jobs arrive online one after another and have to be immediately placed on one of a given set of machines without knowledge about jobs that may…
In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our…
Load balancing plays a critical role in efficiently dispatching jobs in parallel-server systems such as cloud networks and data centers. A fundamental challenge in the design of load balancing algorithms is to achieve an optimal trade-off…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
This paper studies how a fixed flexibility budget should be allocated across the two sides of a balanced bipartite matching market. We model compatibilities via a sparse bipartite stochastic block model in which flexible agents are more…
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…