Related papers: Partial Truthfulness in Minimal Peer Prediction Me…
We prove a new minimax theorem connecting the worst-case Bayesian regret and minimax regret under partial monitoring with no assumptions on the space of signals or decisions of the adversary. We then generalise the information-theoretic…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
We study the problem of designing replication-proof bandit mechanisms when agents strategically register or replicate their own arms to maximize their payoff. Specifically, we consider Bayesian agents who only know the distribution from…
The problem of estimating event truths from conflicting agent opinions in a social network is investigated. An autoencoder learns the complex relationships between event truths, agent reliabilities and agent observations. A Bayesian network…
In this work, we consider the consensus problem in which legitimate agents share their values over an undirected communication network in the presence of malicious or faulty agents. Different from the previous works, we characterize the…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
We consider a variant of continuous-state partially-observable stochastic games with neural perception mechanisms and an asymmetric information structure. One agent has partial information, with the observation function implemented as a…
Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of $n$, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…
We consider an example of stochastic games with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have…
Recently, there has been a number of papers relating mechanism design and privacy (e.g., see \cite{MT07,Xia11,CCKMV11,NST12,NOS12,HK12}). All of these papers consider a worst-case setting where there is no probabilistic information about…
In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types…
Typically, when evaluating Theory of Mind, we consider the beliefs of others to be binary: held or not held. But what if someone is unsure about their own beliefs? How can we quantify this uncertainty? We propose a new suite of tasks,…
The contextual bandit problem, where agents arrive sequentially with personal contexts and the system adapts its arm allocation decisions accordingly, has recently garnered increasing attention for enabling more personalized outcomes.…
Enterprise agents increasingly operate inside scoped retrieval systems, delegated workflows, and policy-constrained evidence environments. In these settings, access control can be enforced correctly while the system still produces an answer…
We introduce a general approach based on \emph{selective verification} and obtain approximate mechanisms without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of utilitarian voting. Having a good allocation in mind, a…
This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…
Distributed aggregative optimization methods are gaining increased traction due to their ability to address cooperative control and optimization problems, where the objective function of each agent depends not only on its own decision…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…