Related papers: On the Tree Conjecture for the Network Creation Ga…
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…
We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…
Studying the impact of cooperation in strategic settings is one of the cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. Intuitively, allowing more cooperation yields equilibria that are more beneficial for the society of agents. However, for many…
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…
In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a vertex, form a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by simultaneously removing an adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al., 2013). The cost…
We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…
In the network creation game with n vertices, every vertex (a player) buys a set of adjacent edges, each at a fixed amount {\alpha} > 0. It has been conjectured that for {\alpha} >= n, every Nash equilibrium is a tree, and has been…
Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of…
We study network formation with the bilateral link formation rule (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) with $n$ players and link cost $\alpha>0$. After the network is built, an adversary randomly destroys one link according to a certain probability…
Network Creation Games(NCGs) model the creation of decentralized communication networks like the Internet. In such games strategic agents corresponding to network nodes selfishly decide with whom to connect to optimize some objective…
Network Design problems typically ask for a minimum cost sub-network from a given host network. This classical point-of-view assumes a central authority enforcing the optimum solution. But how should networks be designed to cope with…
Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price leading to a network among…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…
Dynamic networks are graphs in which edges are available only at specific time instants, modeling connections that change over time. The dynamic network creation game studies this setting as a strategic interaction where each vertex…
We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improve their communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network. The $n$ nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway to the…
Designing an optimal network topology while balancing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives like cost, performance, and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor, let alone in the case of decentralized network formation. We…
We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as…
We study the sum classic network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. in which $n$ players conform a network buying links at individual price $\alpha$. When studying this model we are mostly interested in \emph{Nash equilibria}…
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…