Related papers: Targeting in Quantum Persuasion Problems
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
Quantum decision theory (QDT) is a recently developed theory of decision making based on the mathematics of Hilbert spaces, a framework known in physics for its application to quantum mechanics. This framework formalizes the concept of…
The purpose of quantum tomography is to determine an unknown quantum state from measurement outcome statistics. There are two obvious ways to generalize this setting. First, our task need not be the determination of any possible input state…
The quantum prepare-and-measure scenario has been studied under various physical assumptions on the emitted states. Here, we first discuss how different assumptions are conceptually and formally related. We then identify one that can serve…
Measurement combined with feedback that aims to restore a presumed pre-measurement quantum state will yield this state after a few measurement-feedback cycles even if the actual state of the system initially had no resemblance to the…
The single-letter characterisation of the entanglement-assisted capacity of a quantum channel is one of the seminal results of quantum information theory. In this paper, we consider a modified communication scenario in which the receiver is…
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in that conditioned on the receiver's action, the sender derives…
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…
We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after…
We frame dynamic persuasion in a partial observation stochastic control Leader-Follower game with an ergodic criterion. The Receiver controls the dynamics of a multidimensional unobserved state process. Information is provided to the…
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
The formalism of quantum theory in Hilbert space has been applied with success to the modeling and explanation of several cognitive phenomena, whereas traditional cognitive approaches were problematical. However, this 'quantum cognition…
We propose a quantum expected value theory for decision-making under uncertainty. Quantum density operator as value operator is proposed to simulate people's subjective beliefs. Value operator guides people to choose corresponding actions…
This paper provides the foundations of a unified cognitive decision-making framework (QulBIT) which is derived from quantum theory. The main advantage of this framework is that it can cater for paradoxical and irrational human decision…
Categorization is a significant task in decision-making, which is a key part of human behavior. An interference effect is caused by categorization in some cases, which breaks the total probability principle. A negation quantum model (NQ…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility.…
Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…
In the classic scoring rule setting, a principal incentivizes an agent to truthfully report their probabilistic belief about some future outcome. This paper addresses the situation when this private belief, rather than a classical…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…