Related papers: Targeting in Quantum Persuasion Problems
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…
We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure,…
The standard quantum state discrimination problem can be understood as a communication scenario involving a sender and a receiver following these three steps: (i) the sender encodes information in pre-agreed quantum states, (ii) sends them…
How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the…
We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…
We study the problem of communication over a compound quantum channel in the presence of entanglement. Classically such channels are modeled as a collection of conditional probability distributions wherein neither the sender nor the…
We consider the problem of distributed inference where agents in a network observe a stream of private signals generated by an unknown state, and aim to uniquely identify this state from a finite set of hypotheses. We focus on scenarios…
Bayesian persuasion and its derived information design problem has been one of the main research agendas in the economics and computation literature over the past decade. However, when attempting to apply its model and theory, one is often…
We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…
This paper develops a data-driven approach to Bayesian persuasion. The receiver is privately informed about the prior distribution of the state of the world, the sender knows the receiver's preferences but does not know the distribution of…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We…
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…
In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver faces a sequential decision making (SDM) problem. At each…
We initiate the study of passive environment-assisted communication via a quantum channel, modeled as a unitary interaction between the information carrying system and an environment. In this model, the environment is controlled by a…
A survey is given summarizing the state of the art of describing information processing in Quantum Decision Theory, which has been recently advanced as a novel variant of decision making, based on the mathematical theory of separable…
In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…
Persuasion is the process of changing an agent's belief distribution from a given (or estimated) prior to a desired posterior. A common assumption in the acceptance of information or misinformation as fact is that the (mis)information must…