Related papers: Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games

We prove that the model checking ATL* on concurrent game structures with propositional control for atom-visibility (vCGS) is undecidable. To do so, we reduce this problem to model checking ATL* on iCGS.

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…

The number of quantifiers needed to express first-order properties is captured by two-player combinatorial games called multi-structural (MS) games. We play these games on linear orders and strings, and introduce a technique we call…

We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…

We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) in which one controller plays an impulse control while their opponent plays a stochastic control. We consider an asymmetric setting in which the impulse player commits to, at the start…

Significant progress has been recently achieved in developing efficient solutions for simple stochastic games (SSGs), focusing on reachability objectives. While reductions from stochastic parity games (SPGs) to SSGs have been presented in…

We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer…

Concurrent multi-player games with $\omega$-regular objectives are a standard model for systems that consist of several interacting components, each with its own objective. The standard solution concept for such games is Nash Equilibrium,…

This paper studies strategic decentralization in binary choice composite network congestion games. A player decentralizes if she lets some autonomous agents to decide respectively how to send different parts of her stock from the origin to…

In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…

Resource allocation problems across multiple contests are ubiquitous in adversarial settings, from military operations to market competition. While Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games have provided valuable theoretical foundations for…

Many problems in compositional synthesis and verification of multi-agent systems -- such as rational verification and assume-guarantee verification in probabilistic systems -- reduce to reasoning about two-player multi-objective stochastic…

Property Specification Patterns (PSPs) have been proposed to solve recurring specification needs, to ease the formalization of requirements, and enable automated verification thereof. In this paper, we extend PSPs by considering Boolean as…

Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of…

This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent…

Prior work on automatic control synthesis for cyber-physical systems under logical constraints has primarily focused on environmental disturbances or modeling uncertainties, however, the impact of deliberate and malicious attacks has been…

We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…

We study zero-sum (combinatorial) games, within the framework of so-called Richman auctions (Lazarus et al. 1996) namely, we modify the alternating play scoring ruleset Cumulative Subtraction (CS) (Cohensius et al. 2019), to a discrete…