Related papers: Relaxing Integrity Requirements for Attack-Resilie…
Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to significant physical damage. While offline safety and security assessments can provide insight into vulnerable system components, they may not account for stealthy attacks designed to…
Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…
Malicious attacks on modern autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can leverage information about the system dynamics and noise characteristics to hide while hijacking the system toward undesired states. Given attacks attempting to hide…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma;…
This paper addresses the problem of resilient state estimation and attack reconstruction for bounded-error nonlinear discrete-time systems with nonlinear observations/ constraints, where both sensors and actuators can be compromised by…
This paper deals with the state estimation problem in discrete-event systems modeled with nondeterministic finite automata, partially observed via a sensor measuring unit whose measurements (reported observations) may be vitiated by a…
Interconnected embedded devices are increasingly used invarious scenarios, including industrial control, building automation, or emergency communication. As these systems commonly process sensitive information or perform safety critical…
Research evidence in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) shows that the introduced tight coupling of information technology with physical sensing and actuation leads to more vulnerability and security weaknesses. But, the traditional security…
Providing situational awareness in light of severe coordinated cyber-attacks on power grids, where many measurements may be untrusted, is necessary for reliable monitoring and resilient operation of the grid. In this scenario, the set of…
In this paper, we investigate data-driven attack detection and identification in a model-free setting. We consider a practically motivated scenario in which the available dataset may be compromised by malicious sensor attacks, but contains…
This work presents a rigorous analysis of the adverse effects of cyber-physical attacks on discrete-time distributed multi-agent systems, and propose a mitigation approach for attacks on sensors and actuators. First, we show how an attack…
This paper considers a cyber-physical system under an active eavesdropping attack. A remote legitimate user estimates the state of a linear plant from the state information received from a sensor. Transmissions from the sensor occur via an…
This paper addresses the secure state estimation problem for continuous linear time-invariant systems with non-periodic and asynchronous sampled measurements, where the sensors need to transmit not only measurements but also sampling…
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a tight coupling of computational resources, network communication, and physical processes. They are composed of a set of networked components, including sensors, actuators, control processing units, and…
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…
We study the problem of detecting an attack on a stochastic cyber-physical system. We aim to treat the problem in its most general form. We start by introducing the notion of asymptotically detectable attacks, as those attacks introducing…
A resilient state estimation scheme for uniformly observable nonlinear systems, based on a method for local identification of sensor attacks, is presented. The estimation problem is combinatorial in nature, and so many methods require…
This paper considers the state reconstruction problem for discrete-time cyber-physical systems when some of the sensors can be arbitrarily corrupted by malicious attacks where the attacked sensors belong to an unknown set. We first prove…
We propose a technique to assess the vulnerability of the power system state estimator. We aim at identifying measurements that have a high potential of being the target of false data injection attacks. From an adversary's point of view,…
In remote estimation of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), sensor measurements transmitted through network may be attacked by adversaries, leading to leakage risk of privacy (e.g., the system state), and/or failure of the remote estimator. To…