Related papers: Analysis of a Finite State Many Player Game Using …
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…
We study dynamic finite-player and mean-field stochastic games within the framework of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). Our focus is on discrete time and space structures without monotonicity. Unlike their continuous-time analogues,…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
We use the recently developed probabilistic analysis of mean field games with finitely many states in the weak formulation, to set-up a principal / agent contract theory model where the principal faces a large population of agents…
We consider a scenario where N users try to access a common base station. Associated with each user is its channel state and a finite queue which varies with time. Each user chooses his power and the admission control variable in a dynamic…
A Linear Quadratic Deterministic Continuous Time Game with many symmetric players is considered and the Linear Feedback Nash strategies are studied as the number of players goes to infinity. We show that under some conditions the limit of…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…
We study stochastic static teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, with the goal of obtaining (globally) optimal policies under a decentralized information structure. We present sufficient conditions to connect the concepts…
We introduce a simple class of mean field games with absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding $N$-player games, the evolution of players' states is described by a system of weakly interacting It\^o equations with…
Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…
A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…
We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many…
We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…
We study in this paper three aspects of Mean Field Games. The first one is the case when the dynamics of each player depend on the strategies of the other players. The second one concerns the modeling of '' noise '' in discrete space models…
Mean field games (MFGs) model equilibria in games with a continuum of weakly interacting players as limiting systems of symmetric $n$-player games. We consider the finite-state, infinite-horizon problem with ergodic cost. Assuming Markovian…
The theory of first-order mean field type differential games examines the systems of infinitely many identical agents interacting via some external media under assumption that each agent is controlled by two players. We study the…
Two-player stochastic games are games with two 2 players and a randomised entity called "nature". A natural question to ask in this framework is the existence of strategies that ensure that an event happens with probability 1 (almost-sure…
Independent learners are agents that employ single-agent algorithms in multi-agent systems, intentionally ignoring the effect of other strategic agents. This paper studies mean-field games from a decentralized learning perspective, with two…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…