Related papers: Analysis of a Finite State Many Player Game Using …

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

Mean field games allow to describe tractable models of dynamic games with a continuum of players, explicit interaction and heterogeneous states. Thus, these models are of great interest for socio-economic applications. A particular class of…

The general picture of game theoretic modeling dealt with here is characterized by a set of big players, also referred to as principals or major agents, acting on the background of large pools of small players, the impact of the behavior of…

We identify structural assumptions which provide solvability of the Nash system arising from a linear-quadratic closed-loop game, with stable properties with respect to the number of players. In a setting of interactions governed by a…

We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from…

We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…

We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…

We consider a non-cooperative constrained stochastic games with N players with the following special structure. With each player there is an associated controlled Markov chain. The transition probabilities of the i-th Markov chain depend…

The paper is concerned with the dependence of the solution of the deterministic mean field game on the initial distribution of players. The main object of study is the mapping which assigns to the initial time and the initial distribution…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

We study two-player zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with finite state and action space played for an infinite number of steps. In every step, the two players simultaneously and independently choose an action. Given the current state…

In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

We consider finite horizon stochastic mean field games in which the state space is a network. They are described by a system coupling a backward in time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and a forward in time Fokker-Planck equation. The…

We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…

This paper analyzes a simple game with $n$ players. We fix a mean, $\mu$, in the interval $[0, 1]$ and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the…

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…