Related papers: Equilibria in Sequential Allocation
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
The nested Extremum Seeking (nES) algorithm is a model-free optimization method that has been shown to converge to a neighborhood of a Nash equilibrium. In this work, we demonstrate that the same nES dynamics can instead be made to converge…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…
The Adjusted Winner procedure is an important fair division mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor for allocating goods between two parties. It has been used in practice for divorce settlements and analyzing political disputes. Assuming…
We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…
We introduce a class of resource games where resources and preferences are specified with the language of a resource-sensitive logic. The agents are endowed with a bag of resources and try to achieve a resource objective. For each agent, an…
The problem of finding envy-free allocations of indivisible goods can not always be solved; therefore, it is common to study some relaxations such as envy-free up to one good (EF1). Another property of interest for efficiency of an…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
By utilizing tools from game theory, we develop a novel multi-period-multi-company demand response framework considering the interactions between companies (sellers of energy) and their consumers (buyers of energy). We model the…