Related papers: Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
We establish the expressibility in fixed-point logic with counting (FPC) of a number of natural polynomial-time problems. In particular, we show that the size of a maximum matching in a graph is definable in FPC. This settles an open…
We present a possible kind of generalization of the notion of ordered pairs of cyclic maps and coupled fixed points and its application in modelling of equilibrium in oligopoly markets. We have obtained sufficient conditions for the…
Statistical inference under market equilibrium effects has attracted increasing attention recently. In this paper we focus on the specific case of linear Fisher markets. They have been widely use in fair resource allocation of food/blood…
This paper studies the static economic optimization problem of a system with a single aggregator and multiple prosumers in a Real-Time Balancing Market (RTBM). The aggregator, as the agent responsible for portfolio balancing, needs to…
We present a method for finding envy-free prices in a combinatorial auction where the consumers' number $n$ coincides with that of distinct items for sale, each consumer can buy one single item and each item has only one unit available.…
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…
Many online platforms, ranging from online retail stores to social media platforms, employ algorithms to optimize their offered assortment of items (e.g., products and contents). These algorithms often focus exclusively on achieving the…
This paper proposes an agent-based model that combines both spot and balancing electricity markets. From this model, we develop a multi-agent simulation to study the integration of the consumers' flexibility into the system. Our study…
Price differentiation is a common strategy in many markets. In this paper, we study a static multiproduct price optimization problem with demand given by a discrete mixed multinomial logit model. By considering a mixed logit model that…
Stochastic dynamic matching problems have recently gained attention in the stochastic-modeling community due to their diverse applications, such as supply-chain management and kidney exchange programs. In this paper, we study a matching…
Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, or remain completely unused, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, where social distance constraints are enforced to limit the number of people who can share public…
We propose a new forward electricity market framework that admits heterogeneous market participants with second-order cone strategy sets, who accurately express the nonlinearities in their costs and constraints through conic bids, and a…
Financial markets are often modelled as if time were unique and continuous across assets and markets. Financial markets are however asynchronous, order flow is event-driven, and waiting times between events are often random. Many of the…
In this work, we aim to design a data marketplace; a robust real-time matching mechanism to efficiently buy and sell training data for Machine Learning tasks. While the monetization of data and pre-trained models is an essential focus of…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…
The European power grid can be divided into several market areas where the price of electricity is determined in a day-ahead auction. Market participants can provide continuous hourly bid curves and combinatorial bids with associated…