Related papers: Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

This work presents a descending-price-auction algorithm to obtain the maximum market-clearing price vector (MCP) in unit-demand matching markets with m items by exploiting the combinatorial structure. With a shrewd choice of goods for which…

We study the problem of decision-making in the setting of a scarcity of shared resources when the preferences of agents are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. Taking the two-sided matching market as a running example, we focus…

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…

Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…

We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that…

Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…

Inventory matching is a standard mechanism/auction for trading financial stocks by which buyers and sellers can be paired. In the financial world, banks often undertake the task of finding such matches between their clients. The related…

We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and indivisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et…

In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the…

Computational equilibrium finding in large zero-sum extensive-form imperfect-information games has led to significant recent AI breakthroughs. The fastest algorithms for the problem are new forms of counterfactual regret minimization [Brown…

This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows…

We prove that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-complete even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utility functions. In fact, our proof shows that this market-equilibrium…

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are a popular decentralized exchange mechanism and have recently been the subject of much research, but major CFMMs give traders no privacy. Prior work proposes randomly splitting and shuffling trades…

We present new formulations of the stochastic electricity market clearing problem based on the principles of stochastic programming. Previous analyses have established that the canonical stochastic programming model effectively captures the…

Collusion in market pricing is a concept associated with human actions to raise market prices through artificially limited supply. Recently, the idea of algorithmic collusion was put forward, where the human action in the pricing process is…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

Fisher markets are one of the most fundamental models for resource allocation. However, the problem of computing equilibrium prices in Fisher markets typically relies on complete knowledge of users' budgets and utility functions and…

Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…

We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a…