Related papers: Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we…
This paper studies an open question in the warehouse problem where a merchant trading a commodity tries to find an optimal inventory-trading policy to decide on purchase and sale quantities during a fixed time horizon in order to maximize…
We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell future output. Instead, firms use polynomial expansions to approximate prices.…
We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with linear utilities. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the weakly-polynomial Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm. We use the DM…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a model for competition in markets where each firm offers a schedule of prices and quantities to face demand uncertainty, and has been successfully applied to wholesale electricity markets. However,…
This study is focused on periodic Fisher markets where items with time-dependent and stochastic values are regularly replenished and buyers aim to maximize their utilities by spending budgets on these items. Traditional approaches of…
The two somewhat conflicting requirements of efficiency and fairness make ATFM an unsatisfactorily solved problem, despite its overwhelming importance. In this paper, we present an economics motivated solution that is based on the notion of…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, meaning that every buyer receives a $(1-\delta)$-optimal…
Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…
We introduce the theoretical study of a Platform Equilibrium in a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can join a platform and transact with any buyer or remain off-platform and transact with a subset of…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a central component of decentralized exchanges, yet their equilibrium foundations and microeconomic mechanisms remain incompletely understood. This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium framework for…
We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…
The fair division of chores, as well as mixed manna (goods and chores), has received substantial recent attention in the fair division literature; however, ours is the first paper to extend this research to matching markets. Indeed, our…
Following the work of Babaioff et al, we consider the pricing game with strategic vendors and a single buyer, modeling a scenario in which multiple competing vendors have very good knowledge of a buyer, as is common in online markets. We…