Related papers: Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets
The rise of the machine learning (ML) model economy has intertwined markets for training datasets and pre-trained models. However, most pricing approaches still separate data and model transactions or rely on broker-centric pipelines that…
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are $p\ge 2$ types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on…
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…
Flexibility markets can be introduced as a tool for the distribution system operator (DSO) to avoid high costs and public opposition against new network investments. Continuous flexibility markets have the advantage of allowing more…
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…
When sales of a product are affected by randomness in demand, retailers can use dynamic pricing strategies to maximise their profits. In this article the pricing problem is formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem, where the…
A platform commits to a search algorithm that maps prices to search order. Given this algorithm, sellers set prices, and consumers engage in sequential search. This framework generalizes the ordered search literature. We introduce a special…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
Prediction markets are long known for prediction accuracy. This study systematically explores the fundamental properties of prediction markets, addressing questions about their information aggregation process and the factors contributing to…
We explore the striking mathematical connections that exist between market scoring rules, cost function based prediction markets, and no-regret learning. We show that any cost function based prediction market can be interpreted as an…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
As consumer flexibility becomes expected, it is important that the market mechanisms which attain that flexibility are perceived as fair. We set out fairness issues in energy markets today, and propose a market design to address them.…
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
We study mixed bundling and competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs) in a duopoly selling complementary products to heterogeneous customers. One retailer offers mixed bundling while the rival sells only a bundle. We characterize unique…
In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser \cite{hylland} gave a simple and general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method has nice properties -- it is incentive compatible in the large…
We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…
This paper shows that in suitable markets, even with out-of-equilibrium trade allowed, a simple price update rule leads to rapid convergence toward the equilibrium. In particular, this paper considers a Fisher market repeated over an…