Related papers: Approval Voting with Intransitive Preferences
We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved, disapproved,…
Approval voting is a common method of preference aggregation where voters vote by ``approving'' of a subset of candidates and the winner(s) are those who are approved of by the largest number of voters. In approval voting, the degree to…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
Approval-preferential voting is problematical since it combines two different kinds of information that could by themselves lead to different choices. This article analyses the problem and studies a new proposal to deal with it. The…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…
We investigate the complexity of several manipulation and control problems under numerous prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting rules. Particularly, the rules we study include approval voting (AV), satisfaction approval voting (SAV),…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single…
We define a family of runoff rules that work as follows: voters cast approval ballots over candidates; two finalists are selected; and the winner is decided by majority. With approval-type ballots, there are various ways to select the…
Our preferences depend on the circumstances in which we reveal them. We will introduce a dependency which allows us to illustrate the relation between the possibility of winning of particular candidates in a quantum election and the type of…
This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…