Related papers: Truthful Mechanisms for Delivery with Mobile Agent…
Suppose that a set of $m$ tasks are to be shared as equally as possible amongst a set of $n$ resources. A game-theoretic mechanism to find a suitable allocation is to associate each task with a ``selfish agent'', and require each agent to…
This paper focuses on two commonly used path assignment policies for agents traversing a congested network: self-interested routing, and system-optimum routing. In the self-interested routing policy each agent selects a path that optimizes…
In this paper, we consider a multi-modal mobility system of travelers each with an individual travel budget, and propose a game-theoretic framework to assign each traveler to a ``mobility service" (each one representing a different mode of…
In this work, we consider a multi-wheeled payload transport system. Each of the wheels can be selectively actuated. When they are not actuated, wheels are free moving and do not consume battery power. The payload transport system is modeled…
Distributed aggregative optimization methods are gaining increased traction due to their ability to address cooperative control and optimization problems, where the objective function of each agent depends not only on its own decision…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
A set of identical, mobile agents is deployed in a weighted network. Each agent has a battery -- a power source allowing it to move along network edges. An agent uses its battery proportionally to the distance traveled. We consider two…
In this paper, we study the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs in a new game-theoretical environment. In contrast to other game-theoretical settings, we consider the case in which the value of the tasks…
In this paper, we consider a mobility system of travelers and providers, and propose a "mobility game" to study when a traveler is matched to a provider. Each traveler seeks to travel using the services of only one provider, who manages one…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
Modular vehicles present a novel area of academic and industrial interest in the field of multi-agent systems. Modularity allows vehicles to connect and disconnect with each other mid-transit which provides a balance between efficiency and…
Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to stimulate…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines…
In the online load balancing problem on related machines, we have a set of jobs (with different sizes) arriving online, and we need to assign each job to a machine immediately upon its arrival, so as to minimize the makespan, i.e., the…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We propose a distributed algorithm for multiagent systems that aim to optimize a common objective when agents differ in their estimates of the objective-relevant state of the environment. Each agent keeps an estimate of the environment and…
When a large collection of objects (e.g., robots, sensors, etc.) has to be deployed in a given environment, it is often required to plan a coordinated motion of the objects from their initial position to a final configuration enjoying some…