Related papers: Truthful Mechanisms for Delivery with Mobile Agent…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
We study a problem where k autonomous mobile agents are initially located on distinct nodes of a weighted graph (with n nodes and m edges). Each autonomous mobile agent has a predefined velocity and is only allowed to move along the edges…
We consider a scenario consisting of a set of heterogeneous mobile agents located at a depot, and a set of tasks dispersed over a geographic area. The agents are partitioned into different types. The tasks are partitioned into specialized…
Today's networks consist of many autonomous entities that follow their own objectives, i.e., smart devices or parts of large AI systems, that are interconnected. Given the size and complexity of most communication networks, each entity…
We introduce an extension of the Optimal Transport problem when multiple costs are involved. Considering each cost as an agent, we aim to share equally between agents the work of transporting one distribution to another. To do so, we…
Consider a set of items and a set of $m$ colors, where each item is associated to one color. Consider also $n$ computational agents connected by a ring. Each agent holds a subset of the items and items of the same color can be held by…
Information delivery in a network of agents is a key issue for large, complex systems that need to do so in a predictable, efficient manner. The delivery of information in such multi-agent systems is typically implemented through routing…
Given a set of $m$ agents and a set of $n$ items, where agent $A$ has utility $u_{A,i}$ for item $i$, our goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for items…
The basic optimal transportation problem consists in finding the most effective way of moving masses from one location to another, while minimizing the transportation cost. Such concept has been found to be useful to understand various…
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…
When people choose routes minimizing their individual delay, the aggregate congestion can be much higher compared to that experienced by a centrally-imposed routing. Yet centralized routing is incompatible with the presence of…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
The efficient and fair distribution of indivisible resources among agents is a common problem in the field of \emph{Multi-Agent-Systems}. We consider a graph-based version of this problem called Reachable Assignments, introduced by Gourves,…
Optimal transport is a framework that facilitates the most efficient allocation of a limited amount of resources. However, the most efficient allocation scheme does not necessarily preserve the most fairness. In this paper, we establish a…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…
Autonomous multi-agent systems such as hospital robots and package delivery drones often operate in highly uncertain environments and are expected to achieve complex temporal task objectives while ensuring safety. While learning-based…
An overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient resource allocation in wireless networks is presented. Focusing on multiple-access networks, it is demonstrated that game theory can be used as an effective tool to study resource…