Related papers: Diverse Weighted Bipartite b-Matching
We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference ordering over platforms. Each platform enforces group…
The submodular maximization problem is widely applicable in many engineering problems where objectives exhibit diminishing returns. While this problem is known to be NP-hard for certain subclasses of objective functions, there is a greedy…
We define and study greedy matchings in vertex-ordered bipartite graphs. It is shown that each vertex-ordered bipartite graph has a unique greedy matching. The proof uses (a weak form of) Newman's lemma. The vertex ordering is called a…
Motivated by applications from gig economy and online marketplaces, we study a two-sided queueing system under joint pricing and matching controls. The queueing system is modeled by a bipartite graph, where the vertices represent customer…
We study the following vertex-weighted online bipartite matching problem: $G(U, V, E)$ is a bipartite graph. The vertices in $U$ have weights and are known ahead of time, while the vertices in $V$ arrive online in an arbitrary order and…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
Ranking items by their probability of relevance has long been the goal of conventional ranking systems. While this maximizes traditional criteria of ranking performance, there is a growing understanding that it is an oversimplification in…
We perform an experimental study of algorithms for online bipartite matching under the known i.i.d. input model with integral types. In the last decade, there has been substantial effort in designing complex algorithms with the goal of…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…
We consider a private variant of the classical allocation problem: given k goods and n agents with individual, private valuation functions over bundles of goods, how can we partition the goods amongst the agents to maximize social welfare?…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
A basic combinatorial online resource allocation problem is considered, where multiple servers have individual capacity constraints, and at each time slot, a set of jobs arrives, that have potentially different weights to different servers.…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…
We analyze the (parameterized) computational complexity of "fair" variants of bipartite many-to-one matching, where each vertex from the "left" side is matched to exactly one vertex and each vertex from the "right" side may be matched to…
In this paper, we propose a new recommendation algorithm for addressing the problem of two-sided online matching markets with complementary preferences and quota constraints, where agents' preferences are unknown a priori and must be…
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
In this paper, we study the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs in a new game-theoretical environment. In contrast to other game-theoretical settings, we consider the case in which the value of the tasks…
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online…
In this paper, we explore the Mechanism Design aspects of the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs $(A\cup T, E)$. The set $A$ comprises agents, while $T$ represents tasks. The set $E$ is the private…