Related papers: Diverse Weighted Bipartite b-Matching
We study a weighted online bipartite matching problem: $G(V_1, V_2, E)$ is a weighted bipartite graph where $V_1$ is known beforehand and the vertices of $V_2$ arrive online. The goal is to match vertices of $V_2$ as they arrive to vertices…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
Maximum diversity aims at selecting a diverse set of high-quality objects from a collection, which is a fundamental problem and has a wide range of applications, e.g., in Web search. Diversity under a uniform or partition matroid constraint…
Online bipartite matching, where agents are known in advance but items arrive sequentially and must be irrevocably assigned, is fundamental to problems ranging from ride-sharing to online advertising. When agents belong to classes such as…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…
The online bipartite matching problem has offline buyers desiring to be matched to online items. The analysis of online bipartite matching of Eden et al. (2021) is a smoothness proof (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013). Moreover, it can be…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
We introduce a `concrete complexity' model for studying algorithms for matching in bipartite graphs. The model is based on the "demand query" model used for combinatorial auctions. Most (but not all) known algorithms for bipartite matching…
The challenge in the widely applicable online matching problem lies in making irrevocable assignments while there is uncertainty about future inputs. Most theoretically-grounded policies are myopic or greedy in nature. In real-world…
Student placements under diversity constraints are a common practice globally. This paper addresses the selection of students by a single school under a \emph{one-to-one convention}, where students can belong to multiple types but are…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
In the standard model of fair allocation of resources to agents, every agent has some utility for every resource, and the goal is to assign resources to agents so that the agents' welfare is maximized. Motivated by job scheduling, interest…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G$ where every vertex has a capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function on the edge set. We assume $G$ admits a perfect matching, i.e.,…
We consider a generalization of the vertex weighted online bipartite matching problem where the offline vertices, called resources, are reusable. In particular, when a resource is matched it is unavailable for a deterministic time duration…
This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by…
Algorithmic fairness has been a serious concern and received lots of interest in machine learning community. In this paper, we focus on the bipartite ranking scenario, where the instances come from either the positive or negative class and…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…