Related papers: Continuous Patrolling and Hiding Games

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…

We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…

We analyze a two-player game in which players take turns avoiding the selection of certain points within a convex geometry. The objective is to prevent the convex closure of all chosen points from encompassing a predefined set. The first…

We consider a zero sum differential game with lack of observation on one side. The initial state of the system is drawn at random according to some probability $\mu_0$ on $\R^N$. Player-I is informed of the initial position of state while…

We study variants of regular infinite games where the strict alternation of moves between the two players is subject to modifications. The second player may postpone a move for a finite number of steps, or, in other words, exploit in his…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

We examine the long-run behavior of a wide range of dynamics for learning in nonatomic games, in both discrete and continuous time. The class of dynamics under consideration includes fictitious play and its regularized variants, the…

Attack--defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack--defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show that attack--defense trees and…

This paper presents Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) formulations for two classes of two-player zero-sum games: one with a maximum cost value over time, and one with a minimum cost value over time. In the zero-sum game setting, player A minimizes the…

We consider a patrolling game on a graph recently introduced by Alpern et al. (2011) where the Patroller wins if he is at the attacked node while the attack is taking place. This paper studies the periodic patrolling game in the case that…

This work studies the behaviors of two large-population teams competing in a discrete environment. The team-level interactions are modeled as a zero-sum game while the agent dynamics within each team is formulated as a collaborative…

A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the…

We consider a zero-sum stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chain with countable state space and unbounded transition and pay-off rates. The additional feature of the game is that the controllers together with taking actions are also…

We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative.…

Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff,…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

The behaviour of multi-agent learning in competitive settings is often considered under the restrictive assumption of a zero-sum game. Only under this strict requirement is the behaviour of learning well understood; beyond this, learning…

We consider a two player game, where a first player has to install a surveillance system within an admissible region. The second player needs to enter the the monitored area, visit a target region, and then leave the area, while minimizing…

We consider a sub-class of bi-matrix games which we refer to as two-person (hereafter referred to as two-player) additively-separable sum (TPASS) games, where the sum of the pay-offs of the two players is additively separable. The row…

We consider zero-sum games in which players move between adjacent states, where in each pair of adjacent states one state dominates the other. The states in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high…