Related papers: Communication complexity of approximate Nash equil…
Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…
Approximating a Nash equilibrium is currently the best performing approach for creating poker-playing programs. While for the simplest variants of the game, it is possible to evaluate the quality of the approximation by computing the value…
This paper studies the problem of Nash equilibrium approximation in large-scale heterogeneous mean-field games under communication and computation constraints. A deterministic mean-field game is considered in which the non-linear utility…
In recent work of Hazan and Krauthgamer (SICOMP 2011), it was shown that finding an $\eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal value in a two-player game is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size $O(\log n)$ in the random…
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equilibria in two-action graphical games. We consider the two most well-studied approximation notions: $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria…
Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of $\lambda$-Lipschitz games in which every player's payoff function is $\lambda$-Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit…
Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding…
We prove that computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a win-lose bimatrix game with constant sparsity is PPAD-hard for inverse-polynomial $\epsilon$. Our result holds for 3-sparse games, which is tight given that 2-sparse…
The framework outlined in [arXiv:2010.13024] provides an approximation algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of normal form games. Since NASH is a well-known PPAD-complete problem, this framework has potential applications to other $PPAD$…
We introduce new models and new information theoretic measures for the study of communication complexity in the natural peer-to-peer, multi-party, number-in-hand setting. We prove a number of properties of our new models and measures, and…
We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games…
We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…
We consider $\epsilon$-equilibria notions for constant value of $\epsilon$ in $n$-player $m$-actions games where $m$ is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that…
We present a new methodology for computing approximate Nash equilibria for two-person non-cooperative games based upon certain extensions and specializations of an existing optimization approach previously used for the derivation of fixed…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for…
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games…
We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a particular focus on the special case of computing Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria…