Related papers: Extending Finite Memory Determinacy to Multiplayer…
We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in $m$-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the…
We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires $poly(N)$ communication in two-player $N \times N$ potential games, and…
We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in a multi-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group. We will show the following results. 1. The…
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths…
The recent theory of sequential games and selection functions by Mar- tin Escardo and Paulo Oliva is extended to games in which players move simultaneously. The Nash existence theorem for mixed-strategy equilibria of finite games is…
We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
Finite objects and more specifically finite games are formalized using induction, whereas infinite objects are formalized using coinduction. In this article, after an introduction to the concept of coinduction, we revisit on infinite…
Deep Reinforcement Learning combined with Fictitious Play shows impressive results on many benchmark games, most of which are, however, single-stage. In contrast, real-world decision making problems may consist of multiple stages, where the…
In this paper we study team-symmetric games with $m\ge 2$ teams. Players within a team have symmetric identity and have a common payoff function. We show that team-symmetric games always have a team-symmetric Nash equilibrium. We develop…
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions…
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…
We consider the degrees of non-computability (Weihrauch degrees) of finding winning strategies (or more generally, Nash equilibria) in infinite sequential games with certain winning sets (or more generally, outcome sets). In particular, we…
We construct a finite deterministic graphical (DG) game without Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. This game has 3 players $I=\{1,2,3\}$ and 5 outcomes: 2 terminal $a_1$ and $a_2$ and 3 cyclic. Furthermore, for 2 players a…
In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain $2$-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
We present necessary conditions for linear noncooperative N-player delta dynamic games on a generic time scale. Necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash-equilibrium and for a memoryless perfect state Nash-equilibrium are proved.