Related papers: Extending Finite Memory Determinacy to Multiplayer…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

We study potential games on unimodular random graphs of bounded degree, where players interact through the underlying network. Using the unimodular measure, we define a well-posed global potential that captures both finite- and…

We study what dataset assumption permits solving offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. In stark contrast to the offline single-agent Markov decision process, we show that the single strategy concentration assumption is insufficient for…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…

We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…

This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…

We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…

For decades, two-player (antagonistic) games on graphs have been a framework of choice for many important problems in theoretical computer science. A notorious one is controller synthesis, which can be rephrased through the game-theoretic…

Energy parity games are infinite two-player turn-based games played on weighted graphs. The objective of the game combines a (qualitative) parity condition with the (quantitative) requirement that the sum of the weights (i.e., the level of…

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…

Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous…

This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…

The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

We consider two-player partial-observation stochastic games on finite-state graphs where player 1 has partial observation and player 2 has perfect observation. The winning condition we study are \omega-regular conditions specified as parity…

We study stochastic zero-sum games on graphs, which are prevalent tools to model decision-making in presence of an antagonistic opponent in a random environment. In this setting, an important question is the one of strategy complexity: what…