Related papers: Persuasion with Limited Communication
We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single…
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…
We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes…
We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…
Selling a perfectly divisible item to potential buyers is a fundamental task with apparent applications to pricing communication bandwidth and cloud computing services. Surprisingly, despite the rich literature on single-item auctions,…
We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing…
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…
We study the use of Bayesian persuasion (i.e., strategic use of information disclosure/signaling) in endogenous team formation. This is an important consideration in settings such as crowdsourcing competitions, open science challenges and…
We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two candidates, in which the winner of the election is the…
A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…
We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
We study single-item single-unit Bayesian posted price auctions, where buyers arrive sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The seller has complete knowledge of the actual…
Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audited or communicated. We propose explainable information…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We present a recommender system based on the Random Utility Model. Online shoppers are modeled as rational decision makers with limited information, and the recommendation task is formulated as the problem of optimally enriching the…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting in a necessity to relax welfare efficiency and the use…
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in that conditioned on the receiver's action, the sender derives…
When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…