Related papers: Persuasion with Limited Communication
We continue the study of welfare maximization in unit-demand (matching) markets, in a distributed information model where agent's valuations are unknown to the central planner, and therefore communication is required to determine an…
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For…
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…
We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…
We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…
We study market interactions in which buyers are allowed to credibly reveal partial information about their types to the seller. Previous recent work has studied the special case of one buyer and one good, showing that such communication…
We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…
We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in subadditive combinatorial auctions. This problem was originally introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren (STOC'14) as the following simple market scenario: $m$…
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…
We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is…
Bayesian persuasion, a central model in information design, studies how a sender, who privately observes a state drawn from a prior distribution, strategically sends a signal to influence a receiver's action. A key assumption is that both…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure,…
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that,…
In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach to the receiver's problem. A signal is optimal iff the…
We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to $n$ potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a known function of all $n$ private…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…