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This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal…
Optimizing shared vehicle systems (bike/scooter/car/ride-sharing) is more challenging compared to traditional resource allocation settings due to the presence of \emph{complex network externalities} -- changes in the demand/supply at any…
We consider infinite dimensional optimization problems motivated by the financial model called Arbitrage Pricing Theory. Using probabilistic and functional analytic tools, we provide a dual characterization of the super-replication cost.…
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic…
Price discrimination, which refers to the strategy of setting different prices for different customer groups, has been widely used in online retailing. Although it helps boost the collected revenue for online retailers, it might create…
Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami et al. (2005) propose this problem…
Designing fare systems for public transportation networks is a challenging task. A popular approach is to partition the network into fare zones (``zoning'') and fix journey prices depending on the number of traversed zones (``pricing''). In…
Algorithmic decision-making in societal contexts, such as retail pricing, loan administration, recommendations on online platforms, etc., can be framed as stochastic optimization under bandit feedback, which typically requires…
In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…
Fueled by algorithmic advances, AI algorithms are increasingly being deployed in settings subject to unanticipated challenges with complex social effects. Motivated by real-world deployment of AI driven, social-network based suicide…
The common way to optimize auction and pricing systems is to set aside a small fraction of the traffic to run experiments. This leads to the question: how can we learn the most with the smallest amount of data? For truthful auctions, this…
We introduce a novel algorithm for solving network utility maximization (NUM) problems that arise in resource allocation schemes over networks with known safety-critical constraints, where the constraints form an arbitrary convex and…
The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with…
We consider the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem, which is defined as follows. Given a graph G with fixed-cost and pricable edges and two distinct vertices s and t, we may assign prices to the pricable edges. Based on the…
We study the problem of pricing under a Multinomial Logit model where we incorporate network effects over the consumer's decisions. We analyse both cases, when sellers compete or collaborate. In particular, we pay special attention to the…
We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at every step. We design a single algorithm that, for every…
Recently, there were introduced important classes of relatively smooth, relatively continuous, and relatively strongly convex optimization problems. These concepts have significantly expanded the class of problems for which optimal…
This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her…
The advent of online social networks has facilitated fast and wide spread of information. However, some users, especially members of minority groups, may be less likely to receive information spreading on the network, due to their…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret…