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The emergence of massive graph data sets requires fast mining algorithms. Centrality measures to identify important vertices belong to the most popular analysis methods in graph mining. A measure that is gaining attention is forest…
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…
We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static item pricing, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase utility-maximizing bundles at these given prices. We…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…
We introduce and study a multi-class online resource allocation problem with group fairness guarantees. The problem involves allocating a fixed amount of resources to a sequence of agents, each belonging to a specific group. The primary…
Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not realistically model the Generalized…
Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But…
Providing various machine learning (ML) applications in the real world, concerns about discrimination hidden in ML models are growing, particularly in high-stakes domains. Existing techniques for assessing the discrimination level of ML…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing the fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of cake cutting, in which…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…
We consider a dynamic pricing problem in network revenue management where customer behavior is predicted by a choice model, i.e., the multinomial logit (MNL) model. The problem, even in the static setting (i.e., customer demand remains…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
Emerging reconfigurable optical communication technologies allow to enhance datacenter topologies with demand-aware links optimized towards traffic patterns. This paper studies the algorithmic problem of jointly optimizing topology and…
We consider the problem of assigning items to platforms where each item has a utility associated with each of the platforms to which it can be assigned. Each platform has a soft constraint over the total number of items it serves, modeled…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
The assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which subset of products to offer to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple and natural strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are…
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…