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In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
It is common that a jury must grade a set of candidates in a cardinal scale such as {1,2,3,4,5} or an ordinal scale such as {Great, Good, Average, Bad }. When the number of candidates is very large such as hotels (BOOKING), restaurants…
We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of $\tau$ committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of $\tau$ levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in…
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…
We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that…
Categorization axioms have been proposed to axiomatizing clustering results, which offers a hint of bridging the difference between human recognition system and machine learning through an intuitive observation: an object should be assigned…
In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the…
Axiomatizing mathematical structures and theories is an objective of Mathematical Logic. Some axiomatic systems are nowadays mere definitions, such as the axioms of Group Theory; but some systems are much deeper, such as the axioms of…
Drafts are sequential round-robin allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues).…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
In the committee voting setting, a subset of $k$ alternatives is selected based on the preferences of voters. In this paper, our goal is to efficiently compute $\textit{ex-ante}$ fair probability distributions over committees. We introduce…
We define a family of runoff rules that work as follows: voters cast approval ballots over candidates; two finalists are selected; and the winner is decided by majority. With approval-type ballots, there are various ways to select the…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been…
The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively,…
We present a new model of collective decision making that captures important crowd-funding and donor coordination scenarios. In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as…