Related papers: How Good is Bargained Routing?
The unprecedented growth of mobile data traffic challenges the performance and economic viability of today's cellular networks, and calls for novel network architectures and communication solutions. Data offloading through third-party WiFi…
We consider the dynamic behavior of several variants of the Network Creation Game, introduced by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03]. Equilibrium networks in these models have desirable properties like low social cost and small diameter, which makes…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…
The price of anarchy (PoA) is a popular metric for analyzing the inefficiency of self-interested decision making. Although its study is widespread, characterizing the PoA can be challenging. A commonly employed approach is based on the…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…
The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…
The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making…
Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…
This work focuses on the design of taxes in atomic congestion games, a commonly studied model for competitive resource sharing. While most related studies focus on optimizing either the worst- or best-case performance (i.e., Price of…
Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted attention of researchers in power systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize a global performance objective, resulting…
Motivated by the increasing attention to overall social benefits in networked multi-agent systems, this paper investigates an optimization problem building on noncooperative games under high-level regulation, which can be formulated in a…
This paper studies an $N$--agent cost-coupled game where the agents are connected via an unreliable capacity constrained network. Each agent receives state information over that network which loses packets with probability $p$. A Base…
We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
Network Creation Games(NCGs) model the creation of decentralized communication networks like the Internet. In such games strategic agents corresponding to network nodes selfishly decide with whom to connect to optimize some objective…
To ensure that social networks (e.g. opinion consensus, cooperative estimation, distributed learning and adaptation etc.) proliferate and efficiently operate, the participating agents need to collaborate with each other by repeatedly…
The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium --- solution of the game --- and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…
We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…