Related papers: Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria …
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean…
We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…
We propose a logical framework combining a game-theoretic study of abilities of agents to achieve quantitative objectives in multi-player games by optimizing payoffs or preferences on outcomes with a logical analysis of the abilities of…
We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $N$-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From…
We define a general framework of partition games for formulating two-player pebble games over finite structures. We show that one particular such game, which we call the invertible-map game, yields a family of polynomial-time approximations…
In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.
Using semi-tensor product of matrices, the structures of several kinds of symmetric games are investigated via the linear representation of symmetric group in the structure vector of games as its representation space. First of all, the…
This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution…
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
We present some categorical investigations into Wittgenstein's language-games, with applications to game-theoretic pragmatics and question-answering in natural language processing.
This paper contributes a new class of games called spacetime games with perfect information. In spacetime games, the agents make decisions at various positions in Minkowski spacetime. Spacetime games can be seen as the least common…