Related papers: Graphical Exchange Mechanisms
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
We provide simple models for the utility function (or psychology) of an actor trading a multitude of goods for money. In this framework, money has no intrinsic consumption value, but is required as a medium of exchange. A collection of such…
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable constraints, giving only second-order consideration to the…
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of…
We represent an exchange economy in terms of statistical ensembles for complex networks by introducing the concept of market configuration. This is defined as a sequence of nonnegative discrete random variables $\{w_{ij}\}$ describing the…
This paper presents a simple method for a posteriori (historical) multi-variate multi-stage optimal trading under transaction costs and a diversification constraint. Starting from a given amount of money in some currency, we analyze the…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
Biological and machine pattern recognition systems face a common challenge: Given sensory data about an unknown object, classify the object by comparing the sensory data with a library of internal representations stored in memory. In many…
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework…
We give lower bounds on the communication complexity of graph problems in the multi-party blackboard model. In this model, the edges of an $n$-vertex input graph are partitioned among $k$ parties, who communicate solely by writing messages…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
Consider a set of items and a set of $m$ colors, where each item is associated to one color. Consider also $n$ computational agents connected by a ring. Each agent holds a subset of the items and items of the same color can be held by…
In this paper we revisit the notion of simplicity in mechanisms. We consider a seller of $m$ items, facing a single buyer with valuation $v$. We observe that previous attempts to define complexity measures often fail to classify mechanisms…
Given a graph where every vertex has exactly one labeled token, how can we most quickly execute a given permutation on the tokens? In (sequential) token swapping, the goal is to use the shortest possible sequence of swaps, each of which…