Related papers: Graphical Exchange Mechanisms
This paper considers the ideal gas-like model of trading markets, where each individual is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally this model introduces…
We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
There is arbitrariness in optimum solutions of graph-theoretic problems that can give rise to unfairness. Incorporating fairness in such problems, however, can be done in multiple ways. For instance, fairness can be defined on an individual…
In this work, we apply a common economic tool, namely money, to coordinate network packets. In particular, we present a network economy, called PacketEconomy, where each flow is modeled as a population of rational network packets, and these…
In the Token Swapping problem we are given a graph with a token placed on each vertex. Each token has exactly one destination vertex, and we try to move all the tokens to their destinations, using the minimum number of swaps, i.e.,…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
We consider the computational complexity of a problem modeling bribery in the context of voting systems. In the scenario of Swap Bribery, each voter assigns a certain price for swapping the positions of two consecutive candidates in his…
A representative investor generates realistic and complex security price paths by following this trading strategy: if, a few ticks ago, the market asset had two consecutive upticks or two consecutive downticks, then sell, and otherwise buy.…
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
This paper presents a novel study on gas-like models for economic systems. The interacting agents and the amount of exchanged money at each trade are selected with different levels of randomness, from a purely random way to a more chaotic…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental…
Two general algorithms based on opportunity costs are given for approximating a revenue-maximizing set of bids an auctioneer should accept, in a combinatorial auction in which each bidder offers a price for some subset of the available…
We consider trading indivisible and easily transferable \emph{durable goods}, which are goods that an agent can receive, use, and trade again for a different good. This is often the case with books that can be read and later exchanged for…
Recently, in order to explore the mechanism behind wealth or income distribution, several models have been proposed by applying principles of statistical mechanics. These models share some characteristics, such as consisting of a group of…