Related papers: Graphical Exchange Mechanisms
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
We discuss the equivalence between kinetic wealth-exchange models, in which agents exchange wealth during trades, and mechanical models of particles, exchanging energy during collisions. The universality of the underlying dynamics is shown…
The increasing use of machine learning in high-stakes domains -- where people's livelihoods are impacted -- creates an urgent need for interpretable, fair, and highly accurate algorithms. With these needs in mind, we propose a mixed integer…
We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these…
We provide a categorical interpretation for escrows, i.e. trading protocols in trustless environment, where the exchange between two agents is mediated by a third party where the buyer locks the money until they receive the goods they want…
Real-world pricing mechanisms are typically optimized using training data, a setting corresponding to the \textit{pricing query complexity} problem in Mechanism Design. The previous work [LSTW23] studies the \textit{single-distribution}…
Trade networks, across which countries distribute their products, are crucial components of the globalized world economy. Their structure is strongly heterogeneous across products, given the different features of the countries which buy and…
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
We analyze a monetary system of random money transfer on the basis of double entry bookkeeping. Without boundary conditions, we do not reach a price equilibrium and violate text-book formulas of economists quantity theory (MV=PQ). To match…
We reconsider the immediate exchange model and define a more general class of models where mass is split, exchanged and merged. We relate the splitting process to the symmetric inclusion process via thermalization and from that obtain…
This paper studies four trading algorithms of a professional trader at a multilateral trading facility, observing a realistic two-sided limit order book whose dynamics are driven by the order book events. The identity of the trader can be…
We study the single-message broadcast problem in dynamic radio networks. We show that the time complexity of the problem depends on the amount of stability and connectivity of the dynamic network topology and on the adaptiveness of the…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
The "Money Exchange Model" is a type of agent-based simulation model used to study how wealth distribution and inequality evolve through monetary exchanges between individuals. The primary focus of this model is to identify the limiting…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…