Related papers: Graphical Exchange Mechanisms
We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in Bergemann et al. (2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design market segments to maximize any linear combination of…
A money transfer involves a buyer and a seller. A buyer buys goods or services from a seller. The money the buyer decreases is the same as that the seller increases. At each time step, a pair of socially connected agents are selected and…
Barter exchange studies the setting where each agent owns a good, and they can exchange with each other if that gives them more preferred goods. This exchange will give better outcomes if there are more participants. The challenge here is…
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…
We provide a geometric proof that the random proposer mechanism is a $4$-approximation to the first-best gains from trade in bilateral exchange. We then refine this geometric analysis to recover the state-of-the-art approximation ratio of…
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonotonic$ mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to $monotonic$…
Collaboration may be understood as the execution of coordinated tasks (in the most general sense) by groups of users, who cooperate for achieving a common goal. Collaboration is a fundamental assumption and requirement for the correct…
The joint degree matrix of a graph gives the number of edges between vertices of degree i and degree j for every pair (i,j). One can perform restricted swap operations to transform a graph into another with the same joint degree matrix. We…
The message complexity of a distributed algorithm is the total number of messages sent by all nodes over the course of the algorithm. This paper studies the message complexity of distributed algorithms for fundamental graph optimization…
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…
We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…
In this paper we aim to find a measure for the diversity of cash flows between agents in an economy. We argue that cash flows can be linked to probabilities of finding a currency unit in a given cash flow. We then use the information…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We discuss price variations distributions in foreign exchange markets, characterizing them both in calendar and business time frameworks. The price dynamics is found to be the result of two distinct processes, a multi-variance diffusion and…
We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism: given commonly known distributions of the buyer's…
This paper considers possible price paths of a financial security in an idealized market. Its main result is that the variation index of typical price paths is at most 2, in this sense, typical price paths are not rougher than typical paths…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
Information exchange is a crucial component of many real-world multi-agent systems. However, the communication between the agents involves two major challenges: the limited bandwidth, and the shared communication medium between the agents,…
We consider the classical cake-cutting problem where we wish to fairly divide a heterogeneous resource, often modeled as a cake, among interested agents. Work on the subject typically assumes that the cake is represented by an interval. In…