Related papers: Graphical Exchange Mechanisms
We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange commodity $i$ for commodity $j$, for certain ordered pairs $ij$. Given any connected graph $G$ of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism $M_{G}$ that…
We consider the communication complexity of finding an approximate maximum matching in a graph in a multi-party message-passing communication model. The maximum matching problem is one of the most fundamental graph combinatorial problems,…
We investigate the structure of the currencies (systems of coins) for which the greedy change-making algorithm always finds an optimal solution (that is, a one with minimum number of coins). We present a series of necessary conditions that…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
A permutation of the elements of a graph is a {\it construction sequence} if no edge is listed before either of its endpoints. The complexity of such a sequence is investigated by finding the delay in placing the edges, an {\it opportunity…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
We study a simple exchange model in which price is fixed and the amount of a good transferred between actors depends only on the actors' respective budgets and the existence of a link between transacting actors. The model induces a…
Given a graph $G=(V,E)$ with $V=\{1,\ldots,n\}$, we place on every vertex a token $T_1,\ldots,T_n$. A swap is an exchange of tokens on adjacent vertices. We consider the algorithmic question of finding a shortest sequence of swaps such that…
The problems of Permutation Routing via Matching and Token Swapping are reconfiguration problems on graphs. This paper is concerned with the complexity of those problems and a colored variant. For a given graph where each vertex has a…
This paper is concerned with general spatially explicit versions of three stochastic models for the dynamics of money that have been introduced and studied numerically by statistical physicists: the uniform reshuffling model, the immediate…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
This paper presents a general framework for the design and analysis of exchange mechanisms between two assets that unifies and enables comparisons between the two dominant paradigms for exchange, constant function market markers (CFMMs) and…
We consider a two-way trading problem, where investors buy and sell a stock whose price moves within a certain range. Naturally they want to maximize their profit. Investors can perform up to $k$ trades, where each trade must involve the…
Auctions are widely used in exchanges to match buy and sell requests. Once the buyers and sellers place their requests, the exchange determines how these requests are to be matched. The two most popular objectives used while determining the…
Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol has substantial structure: it is the solution to an…